![]() The offensive shook the American military command and, perhaps more importantly, the American home front. In late January, beginning on the most sacred of Vietnamese holidays, communist forces launched a sweeping assault across the breadth of South Vietnam. Nowhere was this truer than during the 1968 Tet offensive. And far too often in the planning process, those expectations are based on unexamined or unrealistic assumptions rather than considered reasoning. ![]() A strategist might be able to calculate, rather precisely, the resources available, but setting overarching goals requires delineating certain expectations. If we consider Colin Gray’s definition of strategy as the “bridge that relates military power to political purpose,” then those crafting strategy must consider whether or not the goals they outline are, in fact, attainable. Le Duan’s hopes in late 1967 and early 1968 offer us important perspective on strategy - at its core, strategy is an aspirational art. A decisive military victory would lead to unification and true Vietnamese independence. It would compel the United States to withdraw its troops. It would force the Americans into negotiations. Decisive victory would break a stalemated war in South Vietnam. ![]() For Le Duan, the Hanoi Politburo’s first secretary, a major battlefield success in 1968 promised a great deal. ![]()
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